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Transforming by Metrics that Matter – Progress, 
Participation, and the National Initiatives  
of Fixing Well-Being Indicators 
Philipp Lepenies ∗ 
Abstract: »Transformation durch Zahlen, die zählen - Fortschritt, Partizipation 
und die nationalen Initiativen zur Festlegung von Wohlfahrtsindikatoren«. The 
goal of governments is to enhance the well-being of their citizens. In the af-
termath of World War II, national product (be it gross national or gross domes-
tic) and its rate of growth were seen as a proxy indicator to measure well-being 
– making economic growth doubtless the most powerful political indicator in 
history. Yet, in light of the negative effects of growth such as climate change 
and due to methodological progress in measuring well-being or happiness, 
governments have begun to reconsider the belief that growth automatically 
leads to improved well-being. The Sustainable Development Goals of 2015 un-
derline a universal desire to “transform our world” and the fact that this trans-
formation is to be done with the help of alternative statistical indicators. In the 
last decade, a number of national governments have embarked on a largely 
unnoticed, but revolutionary OECD-driven endeavor: to fix national alternative 
measures of well-being “beyond GDP”, to decide in a participatory manner 
which indicators matter to people and to discuss which new or adapted notion 
of progress is valid in the 21st century. This paper will highlight a number of 
these national cases and analyze the context in which these initiatives evolved. 
It will be shown that although revolutionary in their aspirations, many initia-
tives do not live up to their expectations. This has to do with the manner in 
which they were executed, with the political unwillingness to really consider 
alternatives to GDP and to allow broad participation. But it might also show 
that the expectations regarding the power of indicators to guide policies might 
be exaggerated. 
Keywords: Indicators, Alternative Measures of Well-Being, Progress, Participa-
tion, Beyond GDP. 
1.   Introduction 
In April 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel informed that she planned 
“to converse with citizens.” The idea was “to interact with citizens, in order to 
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orient future policies directly to those issues that are dear to Germans.” As a 
result and after about a year of discussions, a scientific advisory board would 
produce a final report and propose an “action plan” that stipulated how the 
German government is to foster well-being and enhance the quality of life of 
all Germans in the future. The action plan was to be based on a set of new 
indicators that measured whether well-being in Germany had increased – or 
not.1 
Recent years have seen similar initiatives in a number of mostly OECD 
countries. They are part of a wider international process which involves a revo-
lutionary and participatory attempt to recalibrate our traditional notion of pro-
gress, a notion which was based to a large degree on the idea of a possible 
infinite expansion of the production of goods and services and that was seen as 
a proxy for enhanced well-being. And it was measured by Gross Domestic 
Product, GDP, or its rate of change, i.e., “growth”. 2 
It is not only the so-called “grand societal challenges” (climate change, pop-
ulation growth, the finite nature of fossil resources etc.) and thus the quest for 
sustainable development that have led to the desire to let go of the extreme 
fixation on GDP and growth, but also the simple empirical discovery that from 
a specific level of per-capita income onwards, self-perceived quality of life and 
happiness do not improve with further economic growth (Easterlin 1974; Sci-
tovsky 1976). Additionally, the methodology of measuring subjective well-
being and happiness has improved to the point where neuroscientists claim that 
these measurements (which for a long time had been dubbed unreliable and 
unscientific) are now perceived as trustworthy and useful for policy purposes 
(Kahnemann 1999; especially OECD 2008 and Layard 2005).  
Most of these initiatives in question are a result of the “Istanbul-
Declaration” from 2007, signed by numerous international organizations as 
well as by the EU. The declaration expressed the need to redefine well-being 
and progress in countries and to fix adequate indicators by citizen participation. 
The Istanbul Declaration is a clear sign of the broad understanding that the 
fixation of transparent indicators is a necessary and suitable form of modern 
governance. The declaration explicitly names the apparent success of the UN 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as an important point of reference and 
inspiration (OECD 2008, 15). The global financial crisis of 2007 further sensi-
tized many governments that a predominantly economic perspective on well-
being was no longer helpful.  
In this paper, the context of these initiatives will be explained and a compar-
ative description of country cases will show the different processes and actors 
                                                             
1  <https://www.gut-leben-in-deutschland.de/DE/Home/home_node.html>. 
2  Kroll (2011) speaks of these initiatives as a new “Global Movement” that has started roughly 
around the years 2007 and 2008. However, these initiatives have been much more promi-
nent in the OECD member countries than in others.  
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that were involved in them. Although the long-term effects cannot yet be fully 
identified, first lessons learnt can be distilled. What will become obvious is that 
the fixation on statistical indicators carries the risk that the normative debate on 
new understandings of progress and well-being will be framed by the possibil-
ity of measurement and data availability alone. The fact that no country has yet 
managed to let go of the focus on growth via alternative indicators shows that 
these initiatives are, for the time being, not as transformative as planned. Addi-
tionally, although citizen participation has been identified as a cornerstone of 
these initiatives in order to ensure public ownership, relevance and accountabil-
ity, participation has often been minimal and sometimes non-existent.  
One of the reasons for the failure of the initiatives to live up to their expecta-
tions was the idealistic presumption to be able to come up with a meaningful 
and politically influential statistical counterweight to GDP. It appears that the 
unique role of GDP and growth was underestimated: the possible instrumental 
role played by alternative indicators of well-being overestimated. 
In any case, looking at the initiatives of fixing alternative well-being holds 
interesting lessons regarding actors, institutions, discourses and debates in-
volved in transforming by numbers. Within the recent scholarship on indica-
tors, however, a focus on these initiatives has been notably absent (see for 
instance Rottenburg, Merry et al. 2015). Given their historic relevance, and 
even acknowledging that it is too early to distill any final verdict on them, this 
paper will show not only the relevance of looking at the initiatives, but hopeful-
ly also identify possible further research – be in on the role of indicators in 
politics, or the policies of transformation “beyond GDP.”  
2. The Dominance of GDP – Political Acceptance before 
Theory 
A single indicator, GDP (in the form of GDP per capita or of the rate of 
change, i.e., growth – or as Gross National Product before the 1990s) domi-
nates politics. Although technically only aggregating the money value of all 
goods and services produced in a single year, the indicator has served as a 
proxy for societal well-being almost from the beginning. Interestingly, a politi-
cal fixation on growth and GDP was already dominant before academics and 
academic research had come up with a theory of growth, or even used the con-
cept in their models. In other words: this specific statistical indicator influenced 
and dominated policies before being embedded in a theoretical framework – 
the reason being that growth had proven to be a useful tactic to tackle various 
different but pressing political challenges within a very short time span (Lep-
enies 2013, 2015). 
During World War II, Gross National Product (GNP, the predecessor of 
GDP) was invented in the United States by government institutions that were in 
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need of an indicator whose change would document armament production as 
well as the transformation of a peace-time economy into a war economy. The 
entire war planning efforts and resulting political strategies were linked to the 
growth of industrial production. GNP quickly became a dominant indicator 
used by politicians (such as Roosevelt), but also by the press and other media. 
The historian Russel Weigley aptly spoke of World War II as a “GNP war” 
(Weigley 1973). But although GNP was so closely related to war, growth of 
GNP and a focus on enhancing industrial output remained the dominant priori-
ty of politicians after fighting had ended. However, the justification for stress-
ing an expansion of production had shifted. A growing GNP and by that an 
expanding mostly industry-based economy was a necessary precondition for 
the re-integration of returning servicemen into the American job market. At the 
same time, the Marshall Plan made it necessary to find a statistical common 
ground to evaluate and compare the economic strength of recipient countries of 
the funds. GNP thus quickly became the standardized measure of comparison 
between different countries and regions, even the world. In the arms and sys-
tem race with the Soviet Union, and without credible information regarding the 
real economic strength of the Russians (an atomic power able to shoot satellites 
and cosmonauts into space), economic growth was seen as vital in order to 
survive in the Cold War. When in the aftermath of the World War, the material 
living standards of many people in the West improved in a historical unprece-
dented and rapid way, GNP readily served as an indicator for overall well-
being (Lepenies 2013). GNP and its rate of growth quickly became the numeri-
cal expression of Western lifestyle, high levels of material progress and pros-
perity (Collins 2000). GDP, in other words, shifted from an accounting tool 
into a holistic political indicator.  
A full-fledged theory with the dogma of growth at its core appeared only in 
the second half of the 1950s. Arthur Lewis’s publication “The Theory of Eco-
nomic Growth” from 1955 was the first economic monograph that took up the 
issue3 (Lepenies 2015). A few years later, the political literature of moderniza-
tion theory embedded growth in their vision of a possible westernization of the 
world. Western material living standards and Western democratic institutions 
and freedoms were linked to economic growth and rising per capita income. 
All positive elements of the “American way of life” had something to do with 
the economy and how fast it grew (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Rostow 1960). In 
this fashion, the former enlightenment vision of progress entailing a process of 
incremental civilization was given a modern touch through the emphasis on 
growth. But the universalist approach and the teleological unilinearity and 
inevitability of the traditional view of progress were kept in place (Lepenies 
2014a). In equating growth with well-being, economists could also rely on the 
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(Lewis 1954).  
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ideas set out by Cecil Pigou in his “Economics of Welfare” (1920) in which he 
argued that for lack of alternatives, the “measuring rod of money” had to be 
relied upon to measure what he called “economic welfare.” Pigou acknowl-
edged that economic welfare was not the same as general welfare. But he made 
a bold claim: if economic welfare rose through higher income, than it could be 
argued that general welfare improved as well.  
Starting in the 1960s, the political dominance of the idea of growth and the 
methodological shortcomings of GNP were subject to an ever growing body of 
criticism (see e.g., Seers 1969, who spoke of a “problem of measurement,” see 
also Tobin’s and Nordhaus’s famous paper “Is Growth Obsolete?” from 1972 
or the seminal Club of Rome publication “The Limits of Growth”). Within 
development theory, it was telling that alternative approaches, be it the Basic 
Needs approach (Hunt 1989) or, to take another example, the concept of Hu-
man Development (UNDP 1990), often explicitly tried to establish counter-
indicators to GNP or GDP. However, these critical voices never succeeded in 
establishing universally accepted alternatives (in the sense of a true paradigm 
shift).  
The same holds for the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The MDG 
were based on an initiative of the OECD that was to counter mounting criticism 
that the international community had lost track of the social dimension of de-
velopment (especially the question of poverty). This referred to the years of 
neoliberal market euphoria in the 1980s and 1990s when the policy focus lay 
on how to foster growth through liberalization and macroeconomic stability. 
Instead, the MDG attempted to integrate the logic of Results-Based-
Management (which relies on the fixation of measurable goals in order to as-
sess job performance) into the international policy arena – after this had proven 
useful in a number of member states in the modernization and reform of public 
administration. The MDG did not surpass the fixation on GDP, but they estab-
lished the belief that a system of indicators or goals could be fixed to guide and 
direct policies. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) show that this 
belief is still prevalent, as do the national initiatives to fix alternative measures 
of well-being (Lepenies 2014b; Hulme 2007). As noted above, the advances in 
the measurement of well-being additionally provided optimism that a thorough 
counterweight to GDP could be found that could focus on other things than 
“the measuring rod of money.” 
3.  The New Role of Statistics – Beyond GDP 
In 2007, the OECD World Forum “Statistics, Knowledge and Policy” was held 
in Istanbul. The final document, the “Istanbul Declaration”, signed by the 
OECD, the European Commission, the United Nations, the World Bank and 
many other international organizations, spoke of an  
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emerging consensus on the need to undertake the measurement of societal 
progress in every country, going beyond conventional economic measures 
such as GDP per capita. (OECD 2008, 15)4 
According to the OECD, the “information age” allowed access to ever more 
forms of data. This not only made it possible to come to grips with the com-
plexity of the modern and globalized world, it was above all, a chance for the 
survival of democracy:  
Increased access to relevant information for citizens will improve the quality 
of their decision-making and the accountability of their leaders. Better 
knowledge among citizens and leaders will translate into enhanced policies 
and a better future for the next generation. Knowledge about progress, about 
whether or not life is getting better in a society, is one of the most important 
ingredients in this process. (OECD 2008, 3)  
The idea that statistical information and statistical indicators could alter the 
interplay between citizens and governments, that the dialogue between the two 
groups could be based on a transparent and evidence-based fundament, was a 
consequence of the lessons learnt from the MDG. The MDG were hailed as a 
new form of understanding and communication between donor and recipient 
countries, as well as between the citizens of these countries and their govern-
ments. With the fixation of alternative measures of well-being and new 
measures of progress, the OECD wished to establish a similar relationship 
within OECD countries.  
The desire to fix new measures in order to foster democratic processes 
stemmed from a crisis of credibility of official statistics, a dramatic “distrust in 
public figures,” that the OECD had identified in various member countries. In 
countries such as France and the United Kingdom, only one third of the citizens 
trusted official figures (OECD 2008, 20; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009, 3). 
This distrust, that was based on the fact that GDP figures did not seem to re-
flect whether life was getting any better for citizens, let alone measure what 
was dear to them, led – according to the OECD – to a crisis of democracy, that 
could be overcome through the initiatives of fixing alternative indicators of 
well-being. For this to happen, two things were important: firstly, a general and 
open debate on the nature of progress in our times (“encourage communities to 
consider for themselves what ‘progress’ means in the 21st century”) and sec-
ondly, that the citizens should actively participate in this process.  
                                                             
4  A major reason for the belief that alternative measures of progress in a different form than 
GDP was feasible lay in the progress made in the methodology of assessing subjective well-
being and in general, the influence of happiness research on political debates that claimed 
the objective measurability of aspects hitherto unmeasurable. The role of the Istanbul Dec-
laration as a political norm should not be overestimated – yet, it is a clear expression of a 
widespread institutionally felt need to look into politically feasible statistical alternatives to 
GDP. 
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The ideal way forward was sketched by then general secretary of the OECD, 
Angel Gurría, in his conference contribution “Measuring Progress: Does it 
make a Difference for Policy Making and Democracy?”:  
What if we could build, in each and every country, an institution for progress? 
An institution where different parts of society (government, opposition, trade 
unions, business associations, NGOs, academia, media, statisticians and oth-
ers) could discuss what progress means to them and the key indicators to 
measure it. An institution whose progress indicators are seen as having author-
ity and legitimacy. (OECD 2008, 22) 
The Declaration called for urgency in starting the process of fixing new 
measures of progress. Within the OECD, the project “Measuring the Progress 
of Societies” was established in the aftermath. This ultimately resulted in the 
calibration of the interactive indicator system “The Better Life Index” (OECD 
2013). The European Commission followed up with the initiative “Beyond 
GDP” in 2007. The G20 summit of 2009 encouraged its members to rethink 
measurements and to engage in a dialogue with society. 
4.  Measuring Well-being and Participation 
A number of countries reacted to the Istanbul Declaration. The process of how 
various national initiatives came into being will be described as will the ques-
tion of how national statistical institutes were involved, whether and how citi-
zens participated and whether new ideas of progress and well-being were dis-
cussed. Different country cases will be presented that show not only whether 
the suggestions of the declaration have been taken into account, but how differ-
ent contexts have given rise to completely different forms of tackling the issue 
of finding measures “beyond GDP” in a participatory and consequential man-
ner. The sample countries were selected in order to show the broad array of 
different approaches. They comprise France, Australia, Great Britain, Italy, 
Austria, and Germany.5  
4.1  France: The Stiglitz–Sen–Fitoussi Commission 
As early as February 2008 and at the beginning of the global economic crisis, 
French president Nicolas Sarkozy was the first national leader to take up the 
suggestions of the Istanbul Declaration and the issue of alternative measures of 
                                                             
5  For an earlier comparison of national case studies, see Lepenies and García Díez (2017). The 
order of presentation is justified by highlighting first the most prominent case to stem from 
the Istanbul initiative (France), then to highlight the country with a longstanding tradition 
of looking into alternative indicators (Australia), after that to include Great Britain, that 
followed the French project as well as the subsequent schemes in Italy, Austria and Germa-
ny. 
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well-being. The “Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress,” led by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Philippe 
Fitoussi that was created at Sarkozy’s request was composed of a group of the 
world’s most eminent social scientists and economists (amongst others Ken-
neth Arrow, Anthony Atkinson, Angus Deaton, Daniel Kahnemann, Robert 
Putnam, Nick Stern, and Cass Sunstein). After one year of deliberations, it 
published a report on the issue of possible alternative measures of well-being 
that instantly became and still is the major reference point on the topic due to 
its thorough theoretical presentation and analysis (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 
2009). 
In the classical French tradition of technocracy, the commission consisted of 
excellent technical experts on the matter – but public participation or delibera-
tion was not a visible part of the exercise.6 Rather than produce a final list of 
indicators, and although the report was based on the credo that “what we 
measures affects what we do – and if our measurements are flawed, decisions 
may be distorted” (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009, 7), the report limited itself 
to presenting suggestions. Next to ideas as to how GDP could be improved, it 
called for a dashboard-approach (instead of searching for a single new aggre-
gate indicator), i.e., that a selection of important indicators should inform poli-
tics. The general focus should no longer be on production, but on well-being, 
especially on human capabilities as well as on issues of sustainability in the 
broadest sense. Moreover, human well-being was to be measured not only by 
objective, but also by subjective measures. Through these recommendations, 
especially the ones on subjective well-being and by coming mostly from econ-
omists, the innovative character of the report made itself felt. 
The foreword written by Sarkozy for an abbreviated version of the report 
published under the title “Mismeasuring our Lives” was remarkable in that he 
admitted that politicians were slaves to a “cult of data” (with respect to GDP), 
but that the numbers had ever less to do with the felt reality of many citizens 
and were no longer useful in reflecting the challenges of our times. He also 
wrote that a growing number of citizens felt deceived by official indicators and 
that this, just as the OECD and others had cautioned, was jeopardizing democ-
racy (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009, viii). The report was addressed to politi-
cal leaders, policy makers, the academic community as well as civil society 
organizations. It was seen as a first step in a global discussion on redefining 
and re-measuring social progress (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009, 10) and 
positioned France as a country that, by direct intervention of its president, took 
the issue of alternative measures seriously. Yet, although the report highlighted 
                                                             
6  Some experts of the commission had, in fact organized a “forum pour d’autres indicateurs 
de richesse” in order to allow some form of public interaction. The forum proposed amongst 
others the idea of a “produit inérieur doux.” However, the impact of this endeavour on the 
commission was negligible.  
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the importance of subjective well-being, it did so without thoroughly incorpo-
rating the views of its own citizens. 
Following the publication of the report, the European Statistical System 
Committee formed a so-called “Sponsorship Group on Measuring Progress, 
Well-Being and Sustainability” headed jointly by Eurostat and the French 
national statistical institute (INSEE). This group consisted of technical experts 
of various European statistical institutes. It was to provide suggestions as to 
which concrete indicators could be used in order to operationalize the ideas set 
out in the Sarkozy report and what steps should be taken in order to implement 
them. The final report of the group was published in 2011 and served as a 
framework for various national initiatives (European Statistical System 2011) 
on methodological and organizational matters. 
4.2  Australia: MAP – Measures of Australia’s Progress 
Australia is a special case. In all questions regarding measuring alternatively 
and allowing for citizen participation, the country is a pioneer and started as 
early as 1996. At that time, and in part influenced by the 1992 UN Rio Summit, 
the national statistical office, the “Australian Bureau of Statistics” (ABS) was 
given the task by the Australian Senate to develop measures that would paint a 
better picture of the well-being of Australians.  
In 2002, Australian statisticians published the first indicator report 
“Measures of Australia‘s Progress” (MAP, ABS 2002). It contained a series of 
statistical indicators from the dimensions economy, society and environment – 
and was an international milestone. The strategy behind this selection was to 
provide a holistic but easily understandable overview over the state of the 
country and the well-being of its citizens. In contrast to the Sarkozy report, the 
MAP report was geared at the wider public, not at specialists or decision mak-
ers alone. A particular emphasis was placed on the question of whether statisti-
cal indicators could show if quality of life was improving or declining (“Is Life 
in Australia getting better?”). In this way, the progress of the nation as a whole 
was to be described, not the success or failure of specific governmental policies 
– the measures were measures of national well-being. Moreover, the report 
adopted a so-called “suite-of-indicator” approach, which implied that relevant 
indicators were presented, but that the reader had to conclude on his or her own 
whether the country was progressing or not, as no final verdict was presented 
by the Bureau itself. One of the masterminds behind MAP was Jon Hall, a 
statistician who was to move to the OECD to become a major policy entrepre-
neur for the cause of well-being measures and the OECD approach behind it. 
Ten years later and as a reaction to the Istanbul Declaration, the indicator set 
was put to test. Australian statisticians wanted to make sure that the dimensions 
and indicators selected a decade earlier were still seen as relevant. For this 
purpose, the ABS conducted a broad national debate in the year 2011/2012 
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under the heading “What is important to you for national progress?” The public 
was to discuss relevant topics and dimensions of well-being. A special empha-
sis was placed on the aspirations of Australian citizens.   
The enquiry started with the online publication of a discussion paper (ABS 
2010) which presented the framework and the main dimensions about which 
information and opinions were sought. With the goal of learning about the state 
of progress in the country, the emphasis of the survey was placed on the di-
mensions society, economy, environment and governance. Over the course of 
18 months citizens were involved via various channels: blogs, social media, 
radio shows, conferences, workshops, etc. In order to reach a broad segment of 
society, a number of celebrities were made part of the project and voiced their 
own ideas regarding progress in order to incite interest and reactions from 
others. An expert commission accompanied the entire process while integrating 
new insights from international and national academic research, as well as the 
needs of local and national administration and organizations. Next to that, a 
separate and special expert group for each of the four dimensions counseled the 
ABS. The findings were published in the report “Measures of Australia’s Pro-
gress – Aspirations for our Nation: A Conversation with Australians about 
Progress, 2011-12” (ABS 2012a, see also ABS 2012b) in which the participa-
tory element was especially highlighted. In the debate that covered elements of 
a new definition of progress (Where do we want to go? What do we aspire to? 
What are our goals?) the ABS saw its role as a facilitator whose duty it was to 
translate public opinion into numbers, but who first had to see that this public 
opinion was expressed.  
With the initiative “MAP 2.0” the ABS subsequently attempted to scrutinize 
by participatory means which concrete progress indicators Australians wanted 
to see fixed at the national level. These indicators were to measure more con-
cretely if Australia was in fact progressing or not. In all these phases the ABS 
was acting without any form of direct political influence. It was able to position 
itself nationally and internationally as an innovative institution that allowed 
citizens to voice their aspirations and their ideas of quality of life while at the 
same time feeling an obligation to transform these opinions into numbers and 
to disseminate relevant information on these issues to the wider public and to 
the political realm.7 
Yet, since 2014, when the ABS saw severe budget cutbacks from the Abbott 
and other governments due to continuing large deficits, the Measures of Aus-
tralia’s Progress have no longer been updated and the exercise discontinued. 
The last data is from 2013. Social statistics in Australia have been cut in order 
to allow a concentration on continuing issuing reliable economic statistics to 
                                                             
7  <http://blog.abs.gov.au/Blog/mapblog2010.nsf/dx/about-map-2.0.htm>. 
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governments that have made it clear that growth and GDP were, not only in 
terms of statistics, what mattered most. 
4.3  Great Britain: “Measuring National Well-Being Programme” 
In November 2010, recently elected Prime Minister David Cameron ordered 
the Office of National Statistics (ONS) to produce and publish reliable, com-
prehensive and relevant statistical data concerning the well-being and progress 
of British society (National Well-Being Programme). In a well-received speech 
in which he introduced his plans to re-define and measure well-being, Cameron 
spoke of a “new school of thought about government’s role in improving peo-
ple’s lives in the broadest sense” according to which it should be the duty of 
government to cater to improving the well-being of its citizens (Gov UK 2010). 
Next to a tribute to the report of the Sarkozy commission, he referred to the 
work of Richard Layard, an economist and happiness researcher (dubbed “hap-
piness tsar” by the British press), who for years had argued that improving 
happiness was the prime responsibility for governments and concrete actions 
should be taken accordingly (Layard 2005).8 The United Kingdom is the coun-
try where not only the lobbying influence of happiness researchers has been 
most pronounced, but where ideals of (Neo-)Benthamite utilitarianism that 
combine well-being or happiness with measurement have always had a political 
following and where the use of the word “happiness” in political debates is 
much more common than in other countries. The innovative work of the New 
Economics Foundation (NEF) on the measurement of well-being was also 
influential in the British case, as was the fact that practically all competing 
parties had, during the election rally, taken up the issue of fostering well-being 
(Allin and Hand, 2017). The visionary character of the initiative was reflected 
(albeit not very precisely) in an article in the Guardian entitled: “David Camer-
on aims to make Happiness the new GDP” (The Guardian 2010). Cameron 
stated that he wanted Britain to be “in the vanguard” of efforts around the 
world to change the accepted measures of national progress “rather than fol-
lowing meekly behind” (BBC 2010) and funded the program with two million 
additional pounds. 
Mirroring the Australian initiative and the Sarkzoy-report recommendations, 
the ONS started its “Measuring National Well-Being Programme” (ONS 2011) 
with a national debate on the question of which topics and issues mattered to 
the people (“What matters to you?”). The debate went on for five months, with 
an impressive participation by the population (34,000 private persons and or-
ganizations voiced their opinion in workshops and participated in surveys in 
which they could deliberate on their own without government officials or other 
experts present). Similar to Australia, various channels (online-fora and public 
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events) were offered to allow a large number of participants. However, alt-
hough many different regional and societal groups were integrated, the results 
of the exercise were not statistically representative of British society.  
The general debate was structured by an ONS discussion paper in which 
five major questions were asked:  
What things in life matter to you? Of the things that matter to you, which 
should be reflected in measures of national well-being? Which of the follow-
ing sets of information do you think help measure national well-being and 
how life in the UK is changing over time? Which of the following ways would 
be best to give a picture of national well-being? As well as: How would you 
use measures of national well-being? (ONS 2011) 
A broad acceptance of the initiative and results by citizens’ deliberation were 
the main goals of the British project. Moreover, the indicator set was to include 
objective measures (economic, social, ecological) as well as measures of sub-
jective well-being, i.e., the perception of one’s own quality of life. In 2011, the 
household surveys of the ONS were extended by questions regarding subjective 
well-being.9 
Two advisory expert groups, the “Advisory Forum”, made up of representa-
tives of private sector enterprises, academia, politics and other relevant stake-
holders, as well as a statistically trained “Technical Advisory Group” coun-
seled the ONS. 
Since then, the ONS has published a number of reports on the state of well-
being in Britain, some every six months, for instance the “Life in the UK Re-
port“ (ONS 2015), next to an “Annual Statistical Bulletin on Personal Well-
Being” (ONS 2014) as well as other thematic reports and interactive indicator 
data online. The ONS reports on  
progress against a set of headline indicators covering areas of our lives includ-
ing our health, natural environment, personal finances and crime. The 
measures include both objective data (for example, unemployment rate) and 
subjective data (for example, satisfaction with job) to provide a more com-
plete view of the nation’s progress than economic measures such as gross do-
mestic product (GDP) can do alone. (ONS 2017)  
The indicators are visualized online through an interactive dashboard. 
Yet, in his remarkable speech on well-being, David Cameron, after dwelling 
in detail on the need to look for alternative measures to GDP, felt obliged to 
state the following:  
People are concerned that talking about wellbeing shows that this government 
is somehow sidelining economic growth as our first concern. At a time when 
we are recovering from the longest and deepest recession since the war, they 
say that all our energies should be just focused on driving up GDP. Now, let 
                                                             
9  <www.ons.gov.uk/ons/interactive/well-being-wheel-of-measures/index.html>. 
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me be very, very clear: growth is the essential foundation of all our aspira-
tions. (Gov UK 2010) 
4.4  Italy: ISTAT/CNEL – “Benessere equo e sostenibile” 
The goal of the Italian project “Benessere equo e sostenibile” (BES) which was 
initiated and executed by both the statistical institute ISTAT as well as by the 
official council of economic advisors CNEL (“Consiglio Nazionale Economia 
e Lavoro”) was to produce an indicator set to measure progress and quality of 
life in Italian society. The director of ISTAT, Enrico Giovannini, had for a long 
time been chief statistician of the OECD and one of the heads (together with 
Jon Hall) behind the Istanbul Declaration and the international movement to 
redefine measures of progress. He was also member of the Sarkozy Commis-
sion. In the Italian case, a mandate of the Italian government was missing. 
Two advisory groups were formed and a broad national survey was held. 
The thematic scope of the indicator set was based on the results of the survey. 
This was done in face-to-face interviews, blogs as well as regional workshops. 
As a result, 2,500 questionnaires were compiled and consultation meetings with 
an expert-led 33-member steering committee were held (consisting of entrepre-
neurs, unionists, women’s rights groups, consumer groups etc.). From these 
discussions, twelve dimensions were identified. In a second step, a group of 
academics and researchers as well as the members of the steering committee 
decided on the best possible statistical indicators for each dimension. The final 
results were roughly 130 selected indicators. These were published annually 
since 2013 in the “Rapporto BES” (ISTAT 2013). Interestingly, one of the 
dimensions was titled “Patrimonio culturale.” In the interviews and surveys it 
appeared that for Italians, one specific thing was of special importance to them, 
namely “l’italianità” – i.e., all things that define being Italian.  
From 2016 onwards, the indicator set has been integrated by law into the 
“Bilancio dello Stato” and since 2018, a selection of twelve BES indicators will 
form part of the official evaluation indicators of the Italian government with the 
help of which the impact of policy actions are to be assessed. This is to be done 
in February of each year. Patrimonio culturale is no longer part of this selec-
tion. Thus, only a fraction of the initial BES indicators has made it into official 
statistics.  
4.5  Austria: Statistik Austria – “Wie geht‘s Österreich?” 
In 2012, Austria set out to create its own alternative indicator set. The initiative 
came from the director of the statistical office, the so-called “fachstatistischer 
Generaldirektor,” as a reaction to the international debate and the publication of 
the report of the European “Sponsorship Group.” As in the other cases, the goal 
of the exercises was to allow a broader understanding of the notions of progress 
and well-being of society and to find adequate measures.  
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“Wie geht’s Österreich?” (How is Austria doing?) was conceived as a pro-
ject that would be the result of a cooperative effort of official statisticians, 
politics and academia. However, the indicators covering the dimensions well-
being, quality of life and environmental sustainability were only fixed through 
a dialogue (in the form of various round-table meetings, expert conferences and 
written feedback) with relevant stakeholders from academia, interest groups 
and different ministries. The set was to guide and cater for the needs of “rele-
vant actors” in the “best possible way,” it was not directly geared at the broad 
public (Pesendorfer et al. 2012, 5). 
After a first fixation of the indicator set “BIP+30” (Statistik Austria 2013) a 
yearly update as well as an update of the selected indicators was envisaged. 
Important aspects for the Austrians were international comparability of the 
indicators and coherence with the European suggestions. Public participation 
was foreseen at a later stage. The early participation of the technical and politi-
cal stakeholders, however, was believed to contribute to “a broad national 
decision making and acceptance of the indicator set” (Statistik Austria 2013, 
26). The wider public was to be able to inform itself through yearly reports and 
interactive graphics on the homepage of Statistik Austria. The indicator set was 
to provide the backdrop to a more thorough national debate (Pesendorfer et al. 
2012, 16). 
In the aftermath of this exercise, the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture and 
the Environment (renamed the Ministry for Sustainability in 2018) has begun 
to coordinate a network comprised of various ministries, private companies, 
NGOs and interest groups under the title “Wachstum im Wandel” (which could 
translate both as “Growth in times of change” and “Changing Growth”) that 
regularly organizes conferences, discussion papers and other forms of transdis-
ciplinary networking features in order to discuss relevant issues regarding 
quality of life and alternative concepts of well-being and environmental sus-
tainability. It is linked to the “Wie geht’s Österreich” initiative, yet independent 
from it and it remains unclear whether it will exert any influence on future 
adaptations to the indicator set.  
4.6  Germany: “W3” and “Gut Leben in Deutschland” 
In Germany, the suggestions of the Sarkozy-Commission as well as the Istan-
bul Declaration first gave rise to expert deliberations in the form of a joint 
report issued by the German and French council of economic advisors (German 
Council of Economic Experts 2010). In contrast to the bold vision of the Sar-
kozy report, the technical experts (mostly economists) forcefully argued against 
the use of measures of subjective well-being and suggested a more traditional 
dashboard of economic and social indicators instead. Their suggestions, how-
ever, were not taken up by political decision makers. 
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In 2009, and in a rare moment of political unanimity, all parties of the Ger-
man Bundestag voted to install a parliamentary enquete-commission titled 
“Wachstum, Wohlstand, Lebensqualität. Wege zu nachhaltigem Wirtschaften 
und gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft” (Growth, 
Well-Being and Quality of Life, Pathways to a Sustainable Economy and Soci-
etal Progress in the Social Market Economy). The commission consisted of 17 
technical experts and researchers and 17 members of parliament of all political 
parties. This group met regularly between 2010 and 2013 and was, at the be-
ginning, met with large interest by the media. The commission was given two 
different tasks. To discuss the role and future of growth and GDP and to pro-
vide an alternative measure. Concretely the commission was required to:  
develop a holistic indicator of well-being and progress. In order to allow a 
suitable basis for assessing political decisions by taking into account econom-
ic, ecological and social criteria, it should be scrutinized how factors of quali-
ty of life and societal progress can be taken into account and condensed into a 
single indicator….Ideally, a new indicator should be developed that is meas-
urable and comparable and that will complement GDP. (Deutscher Bundestag 
2010, my emphasis) 
Public participation was not foreseen. Over the course of time, two opposing 
fractions manifested themselves: one in favor of sticking to growth and GDP as 
a proxy for well-being, the other calling for a radical break with growth–
dominant policies and metrics. Both positions were irreconcilable. For the first 
time in the history of German parliamentary enquete commissions (that usually 
agree on the definition of problems as well as on the solutions to be taken by 
politicians) no unanimous final report was possible. Rather, the almost 1000 
pages of text consist of two different parts with two completely differing view-
points: one in favor of GDP (albeit of a more “qualitative” version of it), the 
other calling for a radical transformation of the economy, society and the corre-
sponding metrics. Moreover, the idea that a single new indicator would be 
found quickly proved unfeasible. Instead, after lengthy discussions, the com-
mission presented a dashboard of different indicators. Dubbed “W3” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2013) and named after the three dimensions of well-
being that it attempted to cover with its overall 12 indicators – participation, 
ecological and material well-being – the government was asked to integrate the 
set into an official annual report on the state of the nation, parallel to the yearly 
reports issues by the German council of economic advisors.  
Although it was the legislative body of German politics that had worked on 
the alternative measures, even if this was done without any participatory ele-
ment, its implementation and adoption was directly impeded by the executive 
branch. The ministry of the interior did not mandate the federal statistical office 
to publish the indicator set by claiming that it required the go-ahead of the 
federal chancellery which it lacked. A few days after the statistical office had 
presented the W3 dataset on its website on its own initiative after the report had 
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been published, it was forced to delete it. After the press and many experts had 
wondered why such financial resources and effort had apparently been wasted 
(a newspaper article ironically titled that “Our Government ignores expensive 
Happiness Formula!” (Welt 2014), the 2013 federal election provided an an-
swer.  
In the coalition contract following the general elections of 2013, the ruling 
parties of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats held that their goal 
was  
to link governmental practice more strongly to the norms and preferences of 
the citizens and will therefore engage in a dialogue with them over their un-
derstanding of quality of life….On the basis of this dialogue, we will develop 
an indicator set and report on the quality of life in Germany. In regular inter-
vals, these reports shall inform in a comprehensive and approachable and un-
derstandable manner on the state of quality of life in Germany and progress 
made. (Bundesregierung 2016, 3)  
Apparently, the executive branch saw that an exercise such as the one under-
taken by Cameron in the United Kingdom – with publicity and public participa-
tion – could serve to show that governments cared.10 
The project “Gut Leben in Deutschland – was uns wichtig ist” (“Living well 
in Germany – what matters to us”) was thus started in April 2015 – as if the 
enquete commission and its results had never existed. The lead institution was 
the German government in the form of the federal chancellery. The initiative 
was dubbed directly as a “governmental policy” which integrated all other 
ministries. Through the internet as well as through more than 200 nationwide 
so-called citizen dialogues (organized by clubs, churches, social organizations 
and unions) at which usually two members of government were present, two 
questions were discussed: what is important for you in your life? as well as: in 
your opinion, what constitutes quality of life in Germany? Almost 9,000 citi-
zens participated in the dialogues, more than 7,000 answered questions online 
or via mail, several thousand comments were given electronically. An academ-
ic advisory group consisting of six persons was given the task to translate the 
results of the debates into measurable indicators. The experts were drawn from 
research institutes and the federal statistical office. They were to act “inde-
pendently” and to combine the voiced preferences of the citizens with state-of-
the-art research findings which they presented in the form of discussion papers. 
The idea was that the report would directly feed into concrete policies. The 
federal statistical office was not given the mandate to execute the initiative, nor 
to monitor the indicators and the data.  
The final report published in late 2016 highlighted how close the under-
standing of quality of life was to the concept of sustainable development – as it 
                                                             
10  After announcing the initiative, Cameron’s approval ratings were especially high (Guardian 
2011). 
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was seen as a holistic concept comprising the economic, social and ecologic 
dimension. In contrast to the British case, the report clearly expressed that the 
role of government was not seen as catering to individual happiness. Instead, 
the responsibility of governmental action was to provide the framework and 
necessary institutional setting that allowed humans to pursue their individual 
goals (Bundesregierung 2016, 3).  
The citizens’ inputs were supposed to reflect German society’s heterogenei-
ty. Yet, they were not statistically representative. Improving the quality of life 
was stated as a prime obligation of government – and the initiative was under-
stood to serve as the starting point of a continuous societal debate. In the final 
report, the indicator set consisted of twelve dimensions and 46 indicators.  
During the course of the year 2015, however, public opinion was influenced 
to a large degree by the mounting refugee crisis and the hasty and massive 
influx of more than a million mostly Syrian and Afghan refugees into Germa-
ny. The public participatory events of the initiative were ever more focused on 
the issue of refugees and national security. This explains why the single most 
important issue for Germans, according to the participatory events of the initia-
tive, was the desire for “peace” – something which a year earlier, would almost 
certainly not have had as much influence on the hearts and minds of Germans 
who suddenly saw themselves directly confronted with effects of civil war in 
Syria.  
Yet, the initiative itself took place largely without the general public taking 
note of the original goal. Additionally, the initiative was met with incredulity 
and was frequently mocked in the German media from the start, even in the 
more serious daily newspapers. These often ridiculed the fact that in the year 
2015 a government made such a fuss about wanting to know what people really 
wanted. When the final report was issued media coverage was minimal at best 
and given the upcoming general elections, no mention had been made as to 
whether these indicators will inform governmental politics in the future.  
5.  Some Observations on Indicator Sets 
Generally, there is “so far no agreed framework for measuring national well-
being” (Allin and Hand 2017, 7). The basic structure of most existing indicator 
sets derives from the main areas suggested in the Sarkozy commission report: 
economic performance, quality of life and ecological sustainability. To date, no 
novel aggregate indicator has been proposed. Instead, the dashboard approach 
dominates. The main areas usually consist of different dimensions. The number 
of dimensions varies greatly from country to country – from a handful to up to 
20. Yet, a number of the following issues are usually found in most indicator 
set dimensions: material well-being, social inclusion, health, employment, 
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housing, security, education, political participation, subjective well-being, and 
the environment. 
These dimensions then are quantified by lead indicators, i.e., those indica-
tors which have been identified as being most suited to give a good quantifiable 
overview. In the case of Italy, the number of lead indicators in the first set was 
130 (ISTAT 2013). 
The fixation of a single lead indicator is no easy matter. If the main dimen-
sion is in itself vague or fairly broad such as social inclusion there are numer-
ous possible statistical indicators that highlight different aspects of the dimen-
sion in question but often no single representative statistic to capture the 
dimension in its entirety or to allow a verdict on the state of the dimension. For 
other dimensions there might be the difficulty to find an indicator that is robust, 
commensurable and for which data is available from official or credible 
sources or regularly over time.  
Some indicators are selected because they have already been part of the data 
collected by statistical authorities. In the main area of material well-being, the 
indicators most often selected are those which long have been part and parcel 
of the system of national accounts (e.g., available household income) or of the 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU–SILC) like 
the risk-of-at-poverty or the 80/20-relation. 
Concerning the dimension of quality of life, typical indicators are life expec-
tancy, self–perceived health perception, the unemployment rate, work satisfac-
tion, feelings of physical safety, the educational level of a society, satisfaction 
with time–use as well as indicators of overall life satisfaction.  
Regarding environmental sustainability, two lead indicators have proven 
dominant: air pollution through emissions and the percentage of renewable 
energy within gross energy consumption. National peculiarities are visible in 
the different sets. Whereas Austria’s set is characterized by a broad array of 
indicators concerning the environment, Australia’s set is concerned with oceans 
and water. The United Kingdom established the set that most thoroughly high-
lighted subjective well-being (in which 18 of 38 lead indicators include subjec-
tive perceptions).11 
A major challenge in fixing measures of well-being is not only that they 
have to be comprehensible and data available, but that changes in data allow 
                                                             
11  For instance: “percentage with medium or high rating of satisfaction with their lives overall, 
percentage who rated their happiness yesterday as medium or high, percentage who were 
somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with their social life, percentage who were some-
what, mostly or completely satisfied with their health, percentage who were somewhat, 
mostly or completely satisfied with their use of leisure time, percentage who felt very or 
fairy safe walking alone after dark, percentage who agreed or agreed strongly that they felt 
they belonged to their neighbourhood, percentage of those who have trust in national Gov-
ernment or percentage who report finding it quite or very difficult to get by financially” 
(ONS 2015). 
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for an accurate assessment of whether a situation is improving or deteriorating. 
In a dashboard approach, difficulties arise through different scales and meas-
urement units, the different aspects of well-being highlighted as well as through 
the trade-off involved in selecting a number of indicators that is easily com-
municable. Closely linked to the issue of selection and communication is that 
of visualization. Here, the initiatives and institutions involved have opted for 
different web-based and often interactive approaches.  
6.  Conclusion 
If one considers the various recent national initiatives of fixing alternative 
indicators of well-being along with the communications of organizations such 
as the OECD, it appears as if we live in revolutionary times. Not only is the 
dominant position of growth and GDP put into question – which would not be a 
novelty in itself – but alternative measures to GDP are looked for and participa-
tory processes of finding out “what matters” are actively undertaken by gov-
ernments, or at least by public institutions for the first time (rather than by 
NGOs or academia). 12  
The fact that the issues of “happiness,” “well-being,” and “quality of life” 
(which can be used interchangeably) have entered into political discourses and 
have even been attempted to be translated into policy-relevant statistical indica-
tors is undoubtedly a remarkable and historically unique development. This is 
even more remarkable taking into account that this is done in a clear under-
standing that the “cult of data” regarding GDP and growth comes at detrimental 
consequences and requires a change of perspective and policies with the help of 
alternative measures.  
Yet, the various national initiatives and their evolution do not fully live up 
to their expectations. One important reason for looking for “metrics that mat-
ter” has been the observed “distrust in public figures” that had been identified 
as a jeopardy to democracy. This is also the reason why citizen participation 
was seen as a vital mechanism not only in fixing indicators but in general dis-
cussions on novel visions of “progress in the 21st century.” Public participation 
has not been a general characteristic feature of the various initiatives. It was 
possible only in some cases in which no representative sample of the popula-
tion took part. It might rightly be considered novel that parts of the population 
have been given the possibility to voice their preferences and concerns during a 
political process like this at all. But this has been a far cry from the proposed 
idea of a broad societal deliberation on a new concept of progress for the 21st 
                                                             
12  For an application of the Multiple Streams Approach to the British initiative, see Bache and 
Reardon 2013. 
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century. Linking the discussions on progress to questions of measurability has 
narrowed the scope of public deliberation as progress means much more than 
just the question of how to measure things. It has made it much harder to dis-
cuss the often non-quantifiable normative issues regarding the society people 
want to live in (regarding for instance questions of fairness and inequality or 
new narratives of what constitutes progress altogether). It has been shown that 
in most cases, public and media interest in the exercises withers away with 
time. Apparently, “the level of outreach and media coverage of the initial na-
tional debate cannot be maintained” (Allin and Hand 2017, 15).13 
Consequently, the national search for metrics that matter has become a mere 
technical exercise in which technical experts and technical institutions (such as 
statistical offices) dominate. The result has often been a compendium of statis-
tical measures that have been around for some time but are presented in a novel 
framework. The only real novel quantitative approach, and one that not every 
national initiative considers, is that of subjective well-being.  
Moreover, not only have some indicator sets been established without the 
initiatives of governments by statistical offices themselves, some initiatives 
have been halted or obstructed by governments, others simply ignored. It is 
unclear whether the metrics themselves have had any direct influence on gov-
ernmental actions. In some cases this is natural, as only radical transformative 
policies with long-term implications might show a change in specific indicators 
over time. These potential policies, however, might transcend the political time 
horizon of active governments, as they do not influence upcoming elections. 
Furthermore, having indicators measured does not automatically mean that 
politicians will be willing or able to base their policies on them. The institu-
tional aspects: Which institution decides on measurability? Which one collects 
and administers the data to the metrics? Is it adequately and sustainably funded 
and staffed and can it act without interference are issues that should not to be 
underestimated. They can jeopardize the whole exercise. 
Notwithstanding, there seems to exist on the one hand within the political 
realm a somewhat naïve belief or rather naïve hope in finding an equally pow-
erful alternative to match GDP and growth – as became clear in the terms of 
reference to the German enquete commission that spoke of the need to develop 
a single (!) holistic alternative metric.14 It is obvious that a dashboard does not 
provide the powerful single counterweight to GDP. And there also exists on the 
other hand at times a political reluctance to really consider going beyond GDP. 
                                                             
13  There is undoubtedly, however, a trade-off between political and practical feasibility and 
transparency in terms of indicators and overall question of fairness, a good life, and pro-
gress. 
14  There are suggestions as to calculate single „national“ aggregate indicators such as the 
Genuine Progress Indicator or the German „Nationaler Wohlfahrtsindex“ (Dieffenbacher 
2013) although with negligible political influence.  
HSR 44 (2019) 2  │  308 
This can only explain why the EU project “Beyond GDP” was renamed “GDP 
and beyond” (EU 2009) making clear that GDP was there to stay – just as the 
remarks by Cameron had suggested. 15  
Here, it is helpful to reconsider the unique history of GDP. In contrast to the 
contemporary alternative measures, GDP was developed at a time in which a 
specific, pressing and concrete political task had to be resolved quickly: man-
aging and winning the war. It was a coincidence that the metric proved useful 
in tackling subsequent dramatic challenges shortly after the war as well – and 
that the usefulness of the measure and the acceptance by the political realm 
came in the absence of theoretical foundations or scientific deliberations from 
academia and academics. In light of this, it seems that it will be hard to estab-
lish true alternative measures to GDP as they have yet to match its practical 
usefulness and broad acceptance. This does not preclude the attempts of trying 
to find alternatives. But it might caution those optimists who believe that pre-
senting numbers that matter alone will lead to politically organized alternative 
and transformative actions.  
The Istanbul Declaration expressed the hope that the felt distrust in numbers 
and the overall fatigue of some citizens with the workings and processes of 
Western democracy could be somewhat addressed through broad participatory 
initiatives of fixing alternative indicators. Even if this aspect seems to have 
been lost in most of the initiatives, the interplay between numbers that matter 
and democracy has gotten even more complicated than in 2009. This is due to 
the rise of not only “fake news,” ideas of “alternative facts,” and “post–truth 
politics,” but also Big Data and the fact that “numbers that matter” are now 
collected by monopolistic tech giants rather than official statistical offices. In 
the United States, a survey has shown that almost 70% of Trump supporters 
distrusted economic data published by the federal government and it has been 
claimed that “antipathy to statistics has become one of the hallmarks of the 
populist right [...] People assume that [...] numbers are manipulated and dislike 
the elitism of resorting to quantitative evidence” (Guardian 2017). This shows 
that the question is no longer whether one finds numbers that matter, but 
whether numbers matter at all. The national initiatives in fixing alternative 
indicators for well-being are, and will continue to be, interesting research areas 
in which important observations and experiences can be distilled regarding the 
interplay between official metrics, narratives of progress, participation and 
political actions that may well be important in the processes of strengthening a 
fact-based democracy.  
                                                             
15  Possibly, the EU wanted to avoid closeness to the title of Herman Daly’s anti-growth bible 
“Beyond Growth. The Economics of Sustainable Development” (Daly 1996). 
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